My favorite resource on this topic is probably Heinrich Schmid's THE DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY OF THE Evangelical Lutheran Church, VERIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES (which can be downloaded from Google Books for free or from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library) because Schmid goes back to the early, orthodox Lutheran Fathers and quotes them verbatim to justify his summary of Christian doctrine.
There is a bit of abbreviating and what it refers to are a number of older orthodox Lutheran theologians:
There is a bit of abbreviating and what it refers to are a number of older orthodox Lutheran theologians:
CAL = Calovius
HALL = Hollazius
QUEN = Quenstedt
GRH = Gerhard
BR = Baier
Here is his treatment of Reason:
§ 5. Excursus. Concerning the Use of Reason in Theology
By the term Reason, we may
understand either the capacity of
intellectual apprehension in general, and this is essential to man, for it is
only by means of this capacity, which distinguishes him from irrational
animals, that he can comprehend the truths of religion. [1] Or, we may
understand by Reason the capacity of acquiring knowledge and appropriating
truths. [2] The knowledge, however, which one thus acquires is, even if true,
still defective and unsatisfactory, [3] and therefore Reason is by no means the
source from which man can draw the knowledge of saving truths, [4] but for
these the revelation contained in Sacred Scripture remains ever the only
source.
The question now arises, how is Reason related to
this revelation, and what use can Theology make of Reason?
Inasmuch as Reason also derives its knowledge from
God, Reason and Revelation are, of course, not opposed to each other. [5] This
holds true, however, only of Reason considered per se., of Reason as it was before the fall of man. This would
have remained conscious of the limits of its sphere; would not have sought to
measure divine things by the rule of natural knowledge; would have subordinated
itself to Revelation, [6] and would have known that there are truths which,
although not in antagonism with it, are yet far beyond its reach. [7]
But the case is very different with Reason as it
dwells now in fallen man; for we must concede that, by man’s fall, such a
change has occurred that Reason now often assumes a position of antagonism to
revealed truth. [8] It still, indeed, possesses some knowledge of divine
things, but this knowledge is obscured in proportion to the moral depravity of
man, and it now, more easily than before, transcends the assigned limits. If
now Reason, already before the fall of man, had to keep within modest limits, with
respect to the truths of Revelation, much less dare it now, in the fallen
condition of man, assume to judge in regard to divine things, or subject the
truths of Revelation to its tests; still less dare it reject that which does
not seem to agree with its knowledge: its duty rather is to subject itself to
Revelation and learn therefrom. If this be done, however, much will again
become intelligible that previously appeared contradictory, and it will again
approach the condition occupied before the fall. But this will be only an
approach to that condition; for just as man, even through regeneration, never
again becomes entirely sinless, so the Reason of the regenerate never attains
its original power. [9] We may therefore say of Reason, even when enlightened,
that it can have no decisive judgment in regard to matters of faith, and
possesses in such matters no normative authority, all the more since this was
true of Reason before the fall. [10]
As to the use, then, that is to be made of Reason in
Theology, it follows, from what has been said, that Reason stands in the
relation merely of a handmaid to Theology. [11] In so far as it is the capacity
for intellectual apprehension in general, the use that is to be made of it will
consist in this, that man, by its help, intellectually apprehends the truths of
Theology, and accepts from it the means of refuting opponents. In so far,
however, as it also conveys knowledge, one may also employ it in the
demonstration of a divine truth; in such a case, Reason would contribute
whatever of natural knowledge it has acquired. And just in the same proportion
as Reason has suffered itself to be enlightened by divine Revelation, will it
be able to demonstrate the harmony of divine truth with natural knowledge. [12]
[1] Cal.
(I, 358): “Human reason denotes either
the intellect of man, that faculty of the rational soul (Holl., ‘the intellectual faculty of
man’) which we doubtless must employ in every kind of knowledge, since man
understands alone by the reason or intellect.” … Holl. (69): “Without the use of reason we cannot understand
or prove theological doctrines, or defend them against the artful objections of
opponents. Surely not to brutes, but to men using their sound reason, has God
revealed the knowledge of eternal salvation in his word, and upon them he has
imposed the earnest injunction to read, hear, and meditate upon his word. The intellect is therefore required, as the receiving subject or apprehending instrument. For, just as we
can see nothing without eyes, and hear nothing without ears, so we understand
nothing without reason.”
[2] Cal. (ibid.): “Or, reason denotes (philosophy itself,
or) the principles known from nature (by the light of nature), and the
discussion or ratiocination based upon these known principles.” These
principles are divided “into organic
and philosophical (strictly so
called). The former (organic) relate
to the mediate disciplines, grammar, rhetoric, and logic.”—(Quen. (I, 39): “These are to be employed
in Theology (as the means of becoming acquainted with Theology), since without
them neither the sense nor significance of the words can be derived, nor the
figures and modes of speech be properly weighed, nor the connection and
consequences be perceived, nor discussions be instituted”). The latter (the philosophical) are again
divided into “philosophical principles
absolutely and unrestrictedly universal (general or transcendental), which
consist of a combination of terms essential and simply necessary, so that they
cannot be overthrown by any argument, not even by the Scriptures; e.g., ‘It is impossible for anything to
be and not to be at the same time;’ ” and “philosophical principles restrictedly universal (special or
particular,) which are indeed true, to a certain extent, hypothetically, or so
far as mere natural knowledge extends, but which, nevertheless, admit of
limitation, and which may be invalidated by counter evidence drawn from
revelation, if not from nature; e.g.,
‘As many as are the persons, so many are the essences,’ etc.” Holl. (68): “Through these philosophical
sources we can also gain a knowledge of God, for there is a natural knowledge
of God, innate and acquired [cognitio Dei naturalis, insita et acquisita] (of
which the Theologians elsewhere speak more at length), knowledge which is also
communicated by divine revelation.” Holl.
(69): “Thus from the principles of reason philosophers attempt to prove the
existence and attributes of God, as subjects belonging to the sciences of
Metaphysics and Pneumatology.”
[3] Cal. (II, 47): “Of the
natural knowledge of God there is predicated, as to those things that are
revealed in nature, imperfection; and as to the supernatural mysteries of
faith, entire worthlessness [nullitas].
[4] Holl. (69):
“Meanwhile, nevertheless, human reason is not a fountain, or primordial
element, from which the peculiar and fundamental principles of faith are
derived.”
[5] Flacius, with his
assertion, that “the knowledge of God, naturally implanted, is a light full of
error, fallacious and deceptive,” and subsequently, Daniel Hofmann (“Philosophy
is hostile to Theology; what is true in Philosophy is false in Theology”), gave
especial occasion to dispute the antagonism between Reason and Revelation.
Cal. (I, 68): “That Philosophy is not opposed to
Theology, and is by no means to be rejected as brutish, terrene, impure,
diabolical, we thus demonstrate: 1. Because the true agrees with the true, and
does not antagonize it. But what is known by the light of nature is no less
true than what is revealed in Scripture; 2. Because natural and philosophical
knowledge has its origin from God; 3. Because Philosophy leads us to the
knowledge of God.”
As this antagonism was still asserted, the Theologians endeavored to
prove it to be only apparent. Cal.
(I, 74): “We must distinguish between a real and an apparent contradiction. The
maxims of Philosophy and the conclusions of Theology do not really contradict
each other, but only appear to do so; for they either do not discuss the same
subject, or they do not describe the same condition, mode, or relation of it;
as when the philosopher says that the essence is multiplied with the
multiplication of persons, he declares this of finite and created persons, not
of divine, of which he knows nothing; concerning the latter, the theologian
teaches that this is not true. When the philosopher says, ‘Of nothing, nothing
comes,’ i.e., by way of generation,
he does not contradict the theologian, who teaches that by the way of creation
something does come from nothing. Let Philosophy remain within the limits of
its own sphere, then it will not contradict Theology, for this treats of a
different subject. But it is not wonderful that those who confound Philosophy
with Theology should find contradictions between them, for they pervert both.” Quen. (I, 43): “We must distinguish
between contrariety and diversity. Philosophy and the principles of Reason are
not indeed contrary to Theology, nor the former to the latter; but there is a
very great difference between those things that are divinely revealed in
Scripture and those which are known by the light of nature.”—As the Theologians
here opposed those who asserted a contradiction between Reason and Revelation,
they also controverted those who claimed too much for Reason, as over against
Revelation, by maintaining that, because Reason came from God, that which
opposes it cannot be true. This charge was brought against the Calvinists,
Socinians, and Arminians. It was admitted, in opposition to them, that Reason
in itself does not contradict Revelation; an inference, however, which might
have become derogatory to divine truth, was obviated by explaining any seeming
contradiction on the ground that Reason, in such a case, had overstepped its
proper limits. To the proposition: “In nowise can that be true which is repugnant
to reason,” Grh. (II, 371)
replies: “Not human Reason, but divine Revelation, is the source of faith, nor
are we to judge concerning the articles of faith according to the dictation of
Reason, otherwise we should have no articles of faith, but only decisions of
Reason. The cogitations and utterances of Reason are to be restricted and
restrained within the sphere of those things which are subject to the decision
of reason, and not to be extended to the sphere of those things which are
placed entirely beyond the reach of reason; otherwise, if they should be
received as absolutely universal, and are found opposed to the mysteries of the
faith, there arise oppositions of science falsely so called, ὰντιθέσεις ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως.” To the objection: “As a
smaller light to a greater, so Reason is not contrary to Scripture,” Grh. (II, 372) answers: “This
contrariety is not necessary, but accidental. Reason restricted to its proper
sphere is not contrary to Scripture, but when it wishes to overleap and surpass
(μεταβαίνειν και ὑπερβαίνειν) this, and to pass judgment
upon the highest mysteries of the faith, by the aid of its own principles,
then, by accident (casually), it comes in conflict with Scripture which informs
us in regard to the mysteries of faith. Just as the stronger light often
reveals those things which were hidden in the weaker, so the light of grace,
enkindled for us in the Word, makes manifest those things which were hidden in
the light of nature. Just as any one, therefore, who would deny those things which
are visible in the greater light because he had not seen them in the smaller,
would fail to appreciate the design and benefit of the smaller, so also he who
denies or impugns the mysteries of faith revealed in the light of grace, on the
ground that they are incongruous with Reason and the light of nature, fails, at
the same time, to make a proper use of the office and benefits of Reason and
the light of nature.” To the proposition: “What is true theologically cannot be
false philosophically, for truth is one,” Grh.
(ibid.) answers: “In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no
contradiction between Philosophy and Theology, because whatever things
concerning the deepest mystery of the faith Theology propounds from Revelation,
these a wiser and sincere Philosophy knows are not to be discussed aud
estimated according to the principles of Reason, lest there be a μετάβασις εἰς ἅλλο γένος (a passing over to another sphere), lest there be a confounding of the
distinctive principles of distinct departments. So when Theology teaches that
Mary brought forth and yet remained a virgin, a truly sensible Philosophy does
not say this assertion is contrary to its conclusion, that it is impossible for
a virgin to bear a child, because it knows that that conclusion must
necessarily be received with this limitation, that for a virgin to bring forth a child naturally and yet
remain a virgin, is impossible. Nor does Theology assert the contrary of this,
for it says, by supernatural and divine
power it came to pass that a virgin brought forth a child. But when some
philosophizer wishes his axioms and assertions to be so general that the
highest mysteries of the faith are to be adjudged by them, and so invades other
spheres, then it comes to pass, by way of accident, that what is true
theologically is pronounced false philosophically; i.e., not according to the proper use of a sound Philosophy, but
according to the miserable abuse of it. Thus, justice and the nature of law is
everywhere the same, i.e., in its
general conception, while, nevertheless, the law of this province is not the
same with the law of that, but each government lives under its own special
laws. So truth is one in its general conception, while each discipline has its
own axioms which are not to be dragged before another tribunal, but to be left
in their own sphere.”
[6] Grh. (II, 372): “Sound
reason is not opposed to the faith, if we accept as such that which is truly
and properly so-called, namely that which does not transcend the limits of its
sphere, and does not arrogate to itself decisions in regard to the mysteries of
faith; or which, enlightened by the Word, and sanctified by the Holy Spirit,
does not follow its own principles in the investigation of the mysteries of
faith, but the light of the Word and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
[7] Grh. (II, 372): “The
articles of faith are not in and of themselves contrary to Reason, but only
above Reason. It may happen, by accident, that they be contrary to Reason,
namely, when Reason assumes to decide concerning them upon its own principles,
and does not follow the light of the Word, but denies and assails them. Hence
the articles of faith are not contrary to, but merely above Reason, since
Reason before the fall was not yet corrupt and depraved; but after the fall
they are not only above but also contrary to corrupt Reason, for this, in so
far as it is thus corrupt, cannot control itself, much less should it wish to
judge concerning these by its own principles.”
[8] Grh. (II, 371): “We
must distinguish between Reason in man before
and since the fall. The former, as such, was never opposed to divine
Revelation; the latter was very frequently thus opposed through the influence
of corruption.” Grh. (II, 362): “Natural human Reason since the fall (1)
is blind, darkened by the mist of error, inwrapped in the shades of ignorance,
exposed to vanity and error; Rom.
1:21; 1 Cor. 3:1;
Gal. 4:8; Eph. 4:17; (2) unskilled in
perceiving divine mysteries and judging concerning them; Matt. 11:27; 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:14 sq.; (3) opposed to
them; Rom. 8:6; 1 Cor. 2:11 sq., 3:18 sq.,
hence is to be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ, 2 Cor. 10:4, 5; (4) and we are commanded to
beware of its seduction, Col. 2:8.
Therefore natural human Reason cannot be a rule for judging in matters of
faith, and any one pronouncing according to its dictation cannot be a judge in
theological controversies.” Quen,
(I, 43): “We must distinguish between Philosophy (i.e., Reason) considered
abstractly and in view of its essence, and Philosophy considered concretely and in view of its existence in a subject
corrupted by sin: viewed in the former light it is never opposed to divine
truth (for the truth is ever presented as uniform and in harmony with the
nature of the objects successively subordinated to it), but viewed in the
latter light, in consequence of the ignorance of the intellect and the
perversion of the will, it is often preposterously applied by the philosopher
to the purposes of perversion and hollow deception. Col. 2:8.”
[9] Grh. (II, 371): “We
are to make a distinction between the reason of man unregenerate and regenerate.
The former counts the mysteries of faith foolishness, but the latter, in so far
as it is such, does not object to them. Then only and only so long is it regenerate
as it follows the light of the Word, and judges concerning the mysteries of the
faith, not by its own principles, but by the Scriptures. We do not reject
Reason when regenerated, renewed, illuminated by the Word of God, restrained
and brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ; this does not draw its
opinions, in matters of faith, from its own sources, but from Scripture; this
does not impugn the articles of belief as does Reason when corrupt, left to
itself, etc. We must distinguish also between Reason partially rectified in this life, and that which is fully rectified in
the life to come. The former is not yet so completely renewed, illuminated,
and rectified that it should be impossible for it to oppose the articles of
faith and impugn them, if it should follow its own guidance. Just as there
remains in the regenerate a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, by which
they are tempted to sin, so there remains in them a struggle between faith and
Reason, in so far as it is not yet fully renewed; this, however, excludes all
opposition between faith and Reason.”
[10] Quen. (I, 43):
“Reason is admissible as an instrument, but not as a rule and a judge: the
formal principles of Reason no one rejects; its material principles, which
constitute its rule for judging of mysteries, no wise man accepts. No material
principle of Reason, as such, but only as it is at the same time a part of
Revelation, produces faith theologically: that God is, we know from nature; we
believe it, however, only through the Scriptures. It does not follow, because
some parts of Scripture are axioms known by nature, that therefore Reason is
the regulator of theological controversies.” Id. (I, 43): “Theology does not not condemn
the use of Reason, but its abuse and its affectation of directorship or its
magisterial use, as normative and decisive in divine things”
[11] Holl. (71): “Reason
is not a leader, but an humble follower of Theology. Hagar serves as the
handmaid of her mistress, she does not command; when she affects to command she
is banished from the sacred home.”
[12] Quen. (I, 42): “A
distinction must be made between the organic
or instrumental use of Reason and its
principles, when they are employed as instruments for the interpretation and
exposition of the Sacred Scriptures, in refuting the arguments of opponents,
drawn from nature and reason, in discussing the signification and construction
of words, and rhetorical figures and modes of speech; and the normal use of philosophical principles,
when they are regarded as principles by which supernatural doctrines are to be
tested. The former we admit, the latter we repudiate.” The following
from Quen. explains and expands
this idea; “It is one thing to employ in Theology the principles and axioms of
philosophy for the purpose of illustration, explanation, and as a secondary
proof, when a matter is decided by the Scriptures; and another to employ them
for the purpose of deciding and demonstrating, or to recognize philosophical
principles, or the argumentation based upon them, as authoritative in Theology,
or to decide by means of them, the matters of faith. The former we do, the
latter we do not. There must be a distinction made between consequences deduced
by the aid of reason from the Sacred Scriptures, and conclusions collected from
the sources of nature and reason. The former must not be confounded with the
latter. For it is one thing to use legitimate, necessary consequences, and
another to use the principles of Reason. It is one thing to draw a conclusion
and deduce consequences from the declarations of Scripture, according to
logical rules, and another to collect consequences from natural principles. A
sort of illustration of heavenly matters can be sought for among those things
which Reason supplies, but a demonstration can never be obtained from that
source, since it is necessary that this should proceed (non ἐξ άλλοτρὶων sed ἐξ ὀικείων) from the same sphere to
which the truth which is to be proved belongs, and not to a foreign one.”
This doctrine of the use of reason Grh.
develops in a manner somewhat different, although substantially the same; as
follows, under the topic, “The Use of Reason in the Rule of Faith.” (I, 76,
seq.): (1) The organic use is the
following: When our reason brings with it, to the work of drawing out the
treasures of divine wisdom hidden in the Scriptures, knowledge of the
grammatical force of words, logical observance of order, rhetorical elucidation
of figures and acquaintance with the facts of nature, derived from the
philosophical branches. This use we greatly commend, yea, we even declare it to
be necessary. (2) As to the edificative
(κατασκευαστικός) use of reason, it is to be
thus regarded. There is a certain natural knowledge of God, Rom. 1:19, 20, but this should be
subordinate to that which is divinely revealed in the Word; so that, where
there is a disagreement, the former should yield to the latter; and where they
agree, the former confirms and strengthens the latter. In short, as a servant
it should, with all due reverence, minister to the latter. (3) The destructive (ἀνασκευαστικός seu
ἐλεγκτικός) use, when legitimate, is the following: Errors in doctrine are first
to be confuted by arguments drawn from the Sacred Scriptures, as the only and
proper source of Theology, but afterwards philosophical reasons may be added,
so that it may be shown that the false dogma is repugnant, not only to the
light of grace, but also to the light of nature. But when the truth of any
doctrine has been clearly proved by unanswerable scriptural arguments, we
should never allow our confidence in it to be shaken by any philosophical
reasons, however specious they may be.”
Id. (II, 9): “Although some things are taught in Theology, which can be
learned in some measure by the light of nature and Reason, yet human Reason
cannot undertake to become thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of faith,
properly so called, by means of its own powers; and as to such things as,
already known from nature, are taught in Theology, it need not seek for proof
elsewhere than in their own proper source, the Word of God, which is abundantly
able to prove them.… In this latter manner the Theologian becomes indebted, for
some things, to the philosopher; not, indeed, as though he were not able to
know them without the aid of philosophical principles, from Scripture, as the
proper and native (οἰκειῳ) source of his own science, but because, in the course of the
investigation, he perceives the truth of the proposition according to the
principles of philosophy.”
That to which Grh. here
merely alludes, the later Theologians, such as Quen., Br., and Holl.
develop at greater length when treating of the pure and mixed articles; by the former of which are understood
those which contain truths that can be known only by Revelation, by the latter
such as contain truths which may, at least in part, be otherwise known. Holl. (68): “Mixed articles of faith
may, in some measure, be known by the principles of Philosophy. But the pure
articles of faith can be learned and proved only from Sacred Scripture as the
appropriate, fundamental, and original source.” But the remark of Quen. is well worthy of attention, that
(I, 39) “in the mixed articles we
grant that special (philosophical) principles may be employed; not, indeed, for
the purpose of decision or demonstration, but merely for illustration, or as a
sort of secondary proof of that which
has already been decided by the Scriptures.” And here belongs also the
statement of Quen., concerning the
formal and material principles of Reason, already quoted in the tenth note.
This statement of Quen. conveys
the same idea as the last, quoted from Grh.,
and is designed to prevent the assignment of the right of decision in the mixed
articles to Reason, although it is to have something to do with them. Those
Theologians who adhere to the distinctive arrangement, described in note
second, of organic and philosophical principles, admit also the use of the
absolutely universal principles in Theology. It may be questioned, however,
whether these are so accurately distinguished from the restrictedly universal
principles which are not admissible, that mistakes may not easily arise. In
regard to this Br. (157) thus
expresses himself: “The material principles of Reason are also with propriety
employed; however, when they are particular or specific, they are subordinated
to the universal principle (the grand source) of Theology; but the universal
principles of Reason may be employed only when they are absolutely necessary,
namely, when the demonstration of the opposite would imply a contradiction. For
otherwise, if the principles of Reason were employed, not absolutely, but
relatively, or, so to speak, universally and necessarily, it might easily
happen that a conclusion would be reached repugnant to the mysteries or to the
articles of faith, even to those of fundamental importance.”[1]
[1] Schmid, H.
(1889). The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church,
Verified from the Original Sources. (C. A. Hay & H. E. Jacobs, Trans.)
(Second English Edition, Revised according to the Sixth German Edition., pp.
39–49). Philadelphia, PA: Lutheran Publication Society.
Here are also some select quotes where Luther deals with Aquinas, Aristotle & Reason and his attitudes towards them:
We know from Moses that the world
was not in existence before 6,000 years ago. Of this it is altogether
impossible to convince a philosopher, because, according to Aristotle, no first
man or last man can be conceded. Although Aristotle leaves unsettled the
problem whether the world is eternal, he leans toward the opinion that it is
eternal. Human reason cannot rise to a higher level than to conclude that the
world is eternal and that countless men have gone before us and are coming
after us; here it is forced to call a halt. But from this very conclusion there
follows the most dangerous opinion that the soul is mortal, for philosophy
knows no more than one infinite. Indeed, human reason cannot avoid being
overwhelmed by the grandeur of this subject matter and coming into conflict
with it. - Martin Luther, “Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 1-5,” AE 1:3-4.
Always be prepared to make a defense to anyone who
calls you to account for the hope that is in you.
Here we shall have to admit
that St. Peter is addressing these words to all Christians, to priests, laymen,
men and women, young and old, and in whatever station they are. Therefore it
follows from this that every Christian should account for his faith and be able
to give a reason and an answer when necessary. Now up to this time the laity
has been forbidden to read Scripture. For here the devil came up with a pretty
trick for the purpose of tearing the people away from Scripture. He thought:
“If I can keep the laity from reading Scripture, then I shall bring the priests
from the Bible into Aristotle.” Then the priests can babble what they please,
and the laity has to listen to what they preach to them. Otherwise, if the
laity were to read Scripture, the priests would also have to study, lest they
be rebuked and overridden. But note that St. Peter tells every one of us to be
prepared to make a defense of our faith. When the time comes for you to die,
neither I nor the pope will be at your side; and if you know no reason for your
hope and say: “I want to believe what the councils, the pope, and our fathers
believed,” then the devil will answer: “But what if they were in error?” Then
he has won, and he drags you into hell. Therefore we must know what we believe,
namely, what God’s Word says, not what the pope or the saintly fathers believe
or say. For you must not rely on a person. No, you must rely on the Word of God
alone.
Hence if someone tackles you, as if you were a
heretic, and asks: “Why do you believe that you are saved through faith?” then
reply: “I have God’s Word and clear statements of Scripture. Thus St. Paul says in Rom. 1:17: ‘He who through faith
is righteous shall live.’ And above (1
Peter 2:6), when St. Peter, on the basis of the prophet Isaiah
(28:16), speaks of Christ, the Living Stone, he says: ‘He who believes in Him
will not be put to shame.’ I build on this, and I know that the Word does not
deceive me.” But if, as other fools do, you want to say: “Ah, we want to hear
how the council decrees! To this we want to cling,” then you are lost.
Therefore you should say: “What do I care about what this or that person
believes or decrees? If the Word of God is not preached, I do not want to hear
what is said.”
You may say: “There is such confusion that no one
knows what to believe. Therefore it is necessary to wait until it is decreed
what one should accept.” Answer: Meanwhile you will also go to the devil. For
when you are lying at death’s door and do not know what to believe, neither I
nor anyone else can help you. Therefore you yourself must know. You must pay no
attention to anyone, and you must cling firmly to the Word of God if you want
to escape hell. And it is also necessary for those who are not able to read to
take hold of and retain several—at least one or two—clear passages from
Scripture and to stand firmly on this ground. For example, there is Gen. 22:18, where God says to Abraham: “And in your Seed
shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” If you have understood this,
you can rely on it and say: “Even if the pope, the bishops, and all the
councils confronted me and said otherwise, I say: ‘This is God’s Word; for me
it is certain; it does not lie. What is to be blessed must be blessed through
the Seed. What does the blessing mean? It means to deliver from the curse, that
is, from sin, death, and hell. Therefore it follows from this statement that he
who is not blessed through the Seed must be lost. Accordingly, my works and
merits cannot contribute anything toward salvation.’ ”
St. Peter’s statement that he who believes in the
Stone will not be put to shame (cf. 2:6) reaches the same conclusion. Now if
someone tackles you and demands the reason for your faith, you must reply:
“Here is the foundation; it cannot deceive me. Therefore I do not care about
what the pope or the bishops teach and decide. If they were true bishops, they
would have to teach the foundation of faith, in order that all Christians might
know it. Yet they continue to cry out that one should not let the laity read
the Scriptures!”
If someone asks you whether you want to have the pope
as a head, you must answer: “Yes, I want to have him as a head, a head of
scoundrels and rascals. And I have a statement made by St. Paul in 1 Tim. 4:1, 3, where he says that some will
give heed to doctrines of demons, who forbid marriage and enjoin abstinence
from foods which God created. It is evident that the pope has forbidden
marriage. Therefore he is the Antichrist. For he acts contrary to what Christ
commands and teaches. What Christ sets free, this the pope binds. When Christ
says that it is not sin, the pope says that it is a sin.”
Therefore we must now learn to give an account for
our faith, for it surely must come to this. If it does not happen here, it must
happen when death comes. Then the devil will step forth and say: “Why have you
called the pope an antichrist?” If you are not prepared to stand your ground
and give a reason, then he has won. Therefore St. Peter now wants to say here:
Now that you have become believers, you will encounter much persecution from
now on. But in persecution you must have a hope and wait for eternal life. And
when you are asked why you have this hope, you must have God’s Word on which to
be able to build.
The sophists have also perverted this text. They say
that one must vanquish the heretics with reason and on the basis of the natural
light of Aristotle, since the Latin expression rationem reddere is used here, as though St. Peter meant that this
should be done by means of human reason. Therefore they say that Scripture is
far too weak to overthrow heretics. This, they say, must be done by reason and
must come from the brain, which must be the source of the proof that faith is
right, even though our faith transcends all reason and is solely a power of
God. Therefore if people refuse to believe, you should keep silence; for you
have no obligation to force them to regard Scripture as God’s Book or Word. It
is sufficient for you to base your proof on Scripture. This you must do when
they take it upon themselves to say: “You preach that one should not hold to
the teaching of men, even though Peter and Paul, yes, even Christ, were men
too.” If you hear people who are so completely blinded and hardened that they
deny that this is God’s Word or are in doubt about it, just keep silence, do
not say a word to them, and let them go their way. Just say: “I will give you
enough proof from Scripture. If you want to believe it, this is good; if not, I
will give you nothing else.” Then you may say: “Ah, in this way God’s Word must
needs be brought into disgrace!” Leave this to God. Therefore it is necessary
to grasp this well and to know how to meet those who stand up now and
make such allegations. - Martin Luther, “The
Catholic Epistles,” AE 30:105-108.
____________________
The second
captivity of this sacrament is less grievous as far as the conscience is
concerned, yet the gravest of dangers threatens the man who would attack it, to
say nothing of condemning it. Here I shall be called a Wycliffite and a heretic
by six hundred names. But what of it? Since the Roman bishop has ceased to be a
bishop and has become a tyrant, I fear none of his decrees; for I know that it
is not within his power, nor that of any general council, to make new articles
of faith.
Some time ago, when I was drinking in scholastic theology,
the learned Cardinal of Cambrai gave me food for thought in his comments on the
fourth book of the Sentences. He
argues with great acumen that to hold that real bread and real wine, and not
merely their accidents, are present on the altar, would be much
more probable and require fewer superfluous miracles—if only the church had not
decreed otherwise. When I learned later what church it was that had decreed
this, namely the Thomistic—that is, the Aristotelian church—I grew bolder, and
after floating in a sea of doubt, I at last found rest for my
conscience in the above view, namely, that it is real bread and real wine, in
which Christ’s real flesh and real blood are present in no other way and to no
less a degree than the others assert them to be under their accidents. I
reached this conclusion because I saw that the opinions of the Thomists,
whether approved by pope or by council, remain only opinions, and would not
become articles of faith even if an angel from heaven were to decree otherwise
[Gal. 1:8]. For what
is asserted without the Scriptures or proven revelation may be held as an
opinion, but need not be believed. But this opinion of Thomas hangs so
completely in the air without support of Scripture or reason that it seems to
me he knows neither his philosophy nor his logic. For Aristotle speaks of
subject and accidents so very differently from St. Thomas that it seems to me
this great man is to be pitied not only for attempting to draw his opinions in
matters of faith from Aristotle, but also for attempting to base them upon a
man whom he did not understand, thus building an unfortunate superstructure
upon an unfortunate foundation.
Therefore I permit every man to hold either of these
opinions, as he chooses. My one concern at present is to remove all scruples of
conscience, so that no one may fear being called a heretic if he believes that
real bread and real wine are present on the altar, and that every one may feel
at liberty to ponder, hold, and believe either one view or the other without
endangering his salvation. However, I shall now set forth my own view.
In the first place, I do not intend to listen or attach
the least importance to those who will cry out that this teaching of mine is
Wycliffite, Hussite, heretical, and contrary to the decree of the church. No
one will do this except those very persons whom I have convicted of manifold
heresies in the matter of indulgences, freedom of the will and the grace of
God, good works and sins, etc. If Wycliffe was once a heretic, they are
heretics ten times over; and it is a pleasure to be blamed and accused by
heretics and perverse sophists, since to please them would be the height of
impiety. Besides, the only way in which they can prove their opinions and
disprove contrary ones is by saying: “That is Wycliffite, Hussite, heretical!”
They carry this feeble argument always on the tip of their tongues, and they
have nothing else. If you ask for scriptural proof, they say: “This is our
opinion, and the church (that is, we ourselves) has decided thus.” To such an
extent these men, who are reprobate concerning the faith [II Tim. 3:8] and untrustworthy,
have the effrontery to set their own fancies before us in the name of the
church as articles of faith.
But there are good grounds for my view, and this above
all—no violence is to be done to the words of God, whether by man or angel.
They are to be retained in their simplest meaning as far as possible. Unless
the context manifestly compels it, they are not to be understood apart from
their grammatical and proper sense, lest we give our adversaries occasion to
make a mockery of all the Scriptures. Thus Origen was rightly repudiated long
ago because, ignoring the grammatical sense, he turned the trees and everything
else written concerning Paradise into allegories, from which one could have
inferred that trees were not created by God. Even so here, when the Evangelists
plainly write that Christ took bread [Matt. 26:26; Mark
14:22; Luke 22:19]
and blessed it, and when the Book of Acts and the Apostle Paul in turn call it
bread [Acts 2:46; I Cor. 10:16; 11:23, 26–28], we have to think of
real bread and real wine, just as we do of a real cup (for even they do not say
that the cup was transubstantiated). Since it is not necessary, therefore, to
assume a transubstantiation effected by divine power, it must be regarded as a
figment of the human mind, for it rests neither on the Scriptures nor on
reason, as we shall see.
Therefore it is an absurd and unheard-of juggling with
words to understand “bread” to mean “the form or accidents of bread,” and
“wine” to mean “the form or accidents of wine.” Why do they not also understand
all other things to mean their “forms or accidents”? And even if this might be
done with all other things, it would still not be right to enfeeble the words
of God in this way, and by depriving them of their meaning to cause so much
harm.
Moreover, the church kept the true faith for more than
twelve hundred years, during which time the holy fathers never, at any time or
place, mentioned this transubstantiation (a monstrous word and a monstrous
idea), until the pseudo philosophy of Aristotle began to make its inroads into
the church in these last three hundred years. During this time many things have
been wrongly defined, as for example, that the divine essence is neither
begotten nor begets; that the soul is the substantial form of the human body.
These and like assertions are made without any reason or cause, as the Cardinal
of Cambrai68 himself admits.
Perhaps they will say that the danger of idolatry demands
that the bread and wine should not be really present. How ridiculous! The
laymen have never become familiar with their fine-spun philosophy of substance
and accidents, and could not grasp it if it were taught to them. Besides, there
is the same danger in the accidents which remain and which they see, as in the
case of the substance which they do not see. If they do not worship the
accidents, but the Christ hidden under them, why should they worship the
[substance of the] bread, which they do not see?
And why could not Christ include his body in the substance
of the bread just as well as in the accidents? In red-hot iron, for instance,
the two substances, fire and iron, are so mingled that every part is both iron
and fire. Why is it not even more possible that the body of Christ be contained
in every part of the substance of the bread?
What will they reply? Christ is believed to have been born
from the inviolate womb of his mother. Let them say here too that the flesh of
the Virgin was meanwhile annihilated, or as they would more aptly say,
transubstantiated, so that Christ, after being enfolded in its accidents,
finally came forth through the accidents! The same thing will have to be said
of the shut door [John 20:19,
26] and of the
closed mouth of the sepulchre, through which he went in and out without
disturbing them.
Out of this has arisen that Babel of a philosophy of a constant quantity
distinct from the substance, until it has come to such a pass that they
themselves no longer know what are accidents and what is substance. For who has
ever proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that heat, color, cold, light, weight,
or shape are mere accidents? Finally, they have been driven to pretend that a
new substance is created by God for those accidents on the altar, all on
account of Aristotle, who says: “It is the nature of an accident to be in
something,” and endless other monstrosities. They would be rid of all these if
they simply permitted real bread to be present. I rejoice greatly that the
simple faith of this sacrament is still to be found, at least among the common
people. For as they do not understand, neither do they dispute whether
accidents are present without substance, but believe with a simple faith that
Christ’s body and blood are truly contained there, and leave to those who have
nothing else to do the argument about what contains them.
But perhaps they will say: “Aristotle teaches that in an
affirmative proposition subject and predicate must be identical,” or (to quote
the monster’s own words in the sixth book of his Metaphysics): “An affirmative proposition requires the agreement of
the subject and the predicate.” They interpret agreement to mean identity.
Hence, when I say: “This is my body,” the subject cannot be identical with the
bread, but must be identical with the body of Christ.
What shall we say when Aristotle and the doctrines of men
are made to be the arbiters of such lofty and divine matters? Why do we not put
aside such curiosity and cling simply to the words of Christ, willing to remain
in ignorance of what takes place here and content that the real body of Christ
is present by virtue of the words? Or is it necessary to comprehend the manner
of the divine working in every detail?
But what do they say when Aristotle admits that all of the
categories of accidents are themselves a subject—although he grants that
substance is the chief subject? Hence for him “this white,” “this large,” “this
something,” are all subjects, of which something is predicated. If that is
correct, I ask: If a “transubstantiation” must be assumed in order that
Christ’s body may not be identified with the bread, why not also a
“transaccidentation,” in order that the body of Christ may not be identified
with the accidents? For the same danger remains if one understands the subject
to be “this white or this round74 is my body.” And for the same
reason that a “transubstantiation” must be assumed, a “transaccidentation” must
also be assumed, because of this identity of subject and predicate.
If however, merely by an act of the intellect, you can do
away with the accident, so that it will not be regarded as the subject when you
say, “this is my body,” why not with equal ease transcend the substance of the
bread, if you do not want it to be regarded either as the subject, so that
“this my body” is no less in the substance than in the accident? After all,
this is a divine work performed by God’s almighty power, which can operate just
as much and just as well in the accident as it can in the substance.
Let us not dabble too much in philosophy, however. Does not
Christ appear to have anticipated this curiosity admirably by saying of the
wine, not Hoc est sanguis meus, but Hic est sanguis meus? [Mark 14:24]. He speaks even
more clearly when he brings in the word “cup” and says: “This cup [Hic calix] is the new testament in my
blood” [Luke 22:20; I Cor. 11:25]. Does it not
seem as though he desired to keep us in a simple faith, sufficient for us to
believe that his blood was in the cup? For my part, if I cannot fathom how the
bread is the body of Christ, yet I will take my reason captive to the obedience
of Christ [II Cor. 10:5],
and clinging simply to his words, firmly believe not only that the body of
Christ is in the bread, but that the bread is the body of Christ. My warrant
for this is the words which say: “He took bread, and when he had given thanks,
he broke it and said, ‘Take, eat, this (that is, this bread, which he had taken
and broken) is my body’ ” [I
Cor. 11:23–24]. And Paul says: “The bread which we break, is it
not a participation in the body of Christ?” [I Cor. 10:16]. He does not say
“in the bread there is,” but “the bread itself is the participation in the body
of Christ.” What does it matter if philosophy cannot fathom this? The Holy
Spirit is greater than Aristotle. Does philosophy fathom their
transubstantiation? Why, they themselves admit that here all philosophy breaks
down. That the pronoun “this,” in both Greek and Latin, is referred to “body,”
is due to the fact that in both of these languages the two words are of the
same gender. In Hebrew, however, which has no neuter gender, “this” is referred
to “bread,” so that it would be proper to say Hic [bread] est corpus meum.
Actually, the idiom of the language and common sense both prove that the
subject [“this”] obviously points to the bread and not to the body, when he
says: Hoc est corpus meum, dos ist meyn
leyp, that is, “This very bread here [iste
panis] is my body.”
Thus, what is true in regard to Christ is also true in
regard to the sacrament. In order for the divine nature to dwell in him bodily
[Col. 2:9], it is not
necessary for the human nature to be transubstantiated and the divine nature
contained under the accidents of the human nature. Both natures are simply
there in their entirety, and it is truly said: “This man is God; this God is
man.” Even though philosophy cannot grasp this, faith grasps it nonetheless.
And the authority of God’s Word is greater than the capacity of our intellect
to grasp it. In like manner, it is not necessary in the sacrament that the
bread and wine be transubstantiated and that Christ be contained under their
accidents in order that the real body and real blood may be present. But both
remain there at the same time, and it is truly said: “This bread is my body;
this wine is my blood,” and vice versa. Thus I will understand it for the time
being to the honor of the holy words of God, to which I will allow no violence
to be done by petty human arguments, nor will I allow them to be twisted into
meanings which are foreign to them. At the same time, I permit other men to
follow the other opinion, which is laid down in the decree, Firmiter, only let them not press us to accept their
opinions as articles of faith (as I have said above). - Martin Luther, “Word and
Sacrament II” AE 36:28-35.
There is quite a bit more but suffice it to say, the Creation of the world, the authority of tradition and use of Aristotelian logic as a way of explaining the sacrament of the altar ontologically & metaphysically are good examples of Luther's thinking on Aristotle, Thomism & the use of Reason in Theology. Luther put it well when he said,
“I reached this conclusion because I saw
that the opinions of the Thomists, whether approved by pope or by council,
remain only opinions, and would not become articles of faith even if an angel
from heaven were to decree otherwise [Gal.
1:8]. For what is asserted without the Scriptures or proven
revelation may be held as an opinion, but need not be believed.”
Amen.
